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Abstract: In this paper I give a definition of assertion that develops William P. $OVWRQ·V 
account. $OVWRQ·V account of assertion combines a responsibility condition R, which 
captures the appropriate socio-normative status that one undertakes in asserting 
something, with an explicit presentation condition, such that the speech act in some way 
presents the content of what is being asserted. I develop AlstoQ·V account of explicit 
presentation and add a Brandomian responsibility condition. I then argue that this 
produces an attractive position on the nature of assertion. 
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0. Introduction1 
In this paper I give a definition of assertion in the Alstonian tradition. William P. 
$OVWRQ·V definition of assertion combines a responsibility condition R, which captures 
the appropriate socio-normative status that one undertakes in asserting something, with 
a presentation condition, such that the speech act in some way presents the content of 
what is being asserted. In this way, Alstonian theories avoid the problems of 
individuation faced by purely social definitions of assertion, which rely only on a 
responsibility condition R2. Exploring the account given by William P. Alston, I will 
suggest that, given appropriate changes, an Alstionian account gives a very attractive 
definition of assertion. Not only does an Alstonian account with a Brandomian 
responsibility condition appropriately individuate assertion, I suggest that the account is 
suitably complex to deal with the challenge put forward by Peter Pagin (2004, 2009) for 
social accounts of assertion. 
                                                          
1  I would like to thank David Bakhurst, Michael Vossen, Agnes Tam, Lesley Jamieson, Brennan 
Harwood, Jared Housten, Harshita Jaiprakash, Aaron Morgulis, Christine Sypnowich, Josh Mozersky and 
Sergio Sissimondo for all of their discussion and helpful comments on various versions of this paper. I 
would also like to acknowledge that much of the time that went into thinking about and starting this 
paper took place on traditional Anishinaabe and Haudenosaunee Territory.  
2 The roots of purely social accounts of assertion can be found in Peirce, who claims that «to assert a 
proposition is to make oneself responsible for its truth» (Pierce, quoted in Macfarlane, 2011: 90). Whilst 
positions of this type have been held by many, including John Searle (1969), I shall only engage with a 
recent version of the position here, given by Robert Brandom. 
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1. $OVWRQ·V$FFRXQW 
William P. Alston gives two questions that any satisfactory theory of assertion must be 
able to answer if it is to individuate assertion. First, what is it that distinguishes the 
expression of a psychological attitude from the assertion that one has that attitude? 
Second, what is the distinction between what is asserted and what is presupposed? 
(Alston, 2000: 115). To this, he adds a third question for theories of assertion that rely 
on a notion of commitment or responsibility ³ if assertion is simply the commitment 
to (the truth of) some proposition, then why is it that in other speech acts, such as 
promising and ordering, I am not asserting the content and necessary preconditions of 
those speech acts? To see why this might be a problem, take the following order, uttered 
by the Major: ´3ROLVK your boots, 3ULYDWHµ Here the Major is committed to the 
following: 
 
That the private will polish her boots. 
That it is possible for the private to polish her boots. 
That the private has boots. 
That there is a private. 
That the private will be placed under an obligation by the utterance of this 
order. 
And so on...3 
 
Thus, if assertion is understood as mere commitment, the Major is asserting all of the 
above. Thus the problem for any sufficient account of assertion is telling us why the 
above commitments are not asserted when orders, promises, or other non-assertoric 
speech acts are performed. 
 
1.1 Explicit Presentation 
These problems, and a frustration with contemporary accounts of assertion lead Alston 
to his fundamental insight: 
 
we assert that p when we ´FRPH right out and say that p in so many wordsµ when 
´ZH explicitly say that pµ This suggests that the difference between asserting that p 
and 5·LQJ that p without asserting it lies in the verbal means employed in the 
utterance, rather than in the psychological attitudes or in any other inner factor. 
Furthermore it suggests that the crucial feature of the sentential vehicle is the 
´H[SOLFLWQHVVµ with which it ´SUHVHQWVµ the p in question. Where the p 5·G is 
´H[SOLFLWO\ SUHVHQWHGµ it is asserted; where not, not (Alston, 2000: 117). 
 
Alston spells out this notion of ¶H[SOLFLW SUHVHQWDWLRQ· in terms of semantic 
isomorphism. That is, a sentence S explicitly presents a proposition p iff S and p are 
semantically isomorphic. S and p are semantically isomorphic iff for each semantic 
element of S there is a corresponding element of p (and vice-versa) and the elements of 
                                                          
3 It is fairly obvious that a good answer to $OVWRQ·V second question will eliminate all but the first 
commitment on this list as a problem. The first commitment on this list is the propositional content of 
the order, and seems to be explicitly presented by the order. I am certainly less worried than Alston about 
saying that in making an order or promise one also asserts the content of the order or promise (see, for a 
defence of this position, Marsili: 2016). Consider Gary :DWVRQ·V example: «Consider also giving directions 
to the library solely by a series of imperatives: ´*R to the next corner, turn right, and continue on to the 
northeast corner of the first intersection with a traffic light. ´, take it that one has told [asserted to] RQH·V 
interlocutor that the library is on the corner of that intersection» (Watson, 2004: 74). Thus despite using 
this problem to show (in part) why Alston is motivated to take his position, I will take it that an 
appropriate response to $OVWRQ·V second question dissolves $OVWRQ·V third question. 
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S and p are each combined in corresponding ways. Thus the proposition that the door is 
open is semantically isomorphic to the following sentences: ´the door is openµ, ´that 
door is openµ, ´LW·V RSHQµ. In each of the above sentences, there are semantic elements 
corresponding to each semantic element of the above proposition ³ a referring 
expression for the door ¶WKH GRRU· ¶WKDW GRRU· and ¶LW· which refers to the door in 
question, a predicative term describing that something is open, and the relation of 
predication between the referring expression and the predicative term (Alston, 2000: 
117). 
Thus in addition to a responsibility condition R (the details of which will be spelled out 
shortly), Alston gives an explicit presentation condition that must be met if one is to 
count as asserting that p. Thus: «U asserted that p in uttering S iff both: R: U 5·G that p. 
EP: S explicitly presents the proposition that p.» (Alston, 2000: 120-121). 
Alston rightly suggests that this deals with his three questions quite nicely. When I say 
´:RZµ or ´(ZZµ I do not explicitly present the proposition that I am excited or the 
proposition that I am disgusted, thus $OVWRQ·V account correctly categorises such 
expressions of emotion as not being assertions. Further, when one asserts ´7KH cat is on 
the PDWµ the proposition that there exists a cat is not explicitly presented by the 
sentence and thus this and other presuppositions of assertions do not count as 
assertions. Finally, when one orders another thus: ´&ORVH the GRRUµ (despite one 5·LQJ 
that there exists a door and 5·LQJ that one has the authority to order another in such a 
way) neither the proposition that there exists a door nor the proposition that one has 
the authority to order another in such a way are explicitly presented by the utterance. 
Thus prima facie all three problems are solved by the introduction of the explicit 
presentation condition. 
However, the explicit presentation condition cannot be as simple as I have presented it 
here. There are cases where we assert that p in uttering S, where S is not semantically 
isomorphic to p. Take the following case suggested by Alston: «Alice: ´:KDW did you 
have for OXQFK"µ. Bobby: ´6RXSµ» (2000: 120). Here Bobby seems to be asserting that 
they had soup for lunch, but the utterance ´6RXSµ is certainly not semantically 
isomorphic to the proposition that Bobby had soup for lunch, as it lacks both the 
semantic elements designating Bobby and lunch, along with the predicate ¶KDG for 
OXQFK· and the appropriate tripartite predication relation between had for lunch and the 
three subjects Bobby, soup and lunch. To deal with cases such as these, Alston 
introduces ellipsis, arguing that the utterance need not explicitly present the proposition 
that p, but need only be elliptical for a sentence that does. Therefore %REE\·V utterance 
does count as an assertion, as ´6RXSµ is elliptical for ´, had soup for OXQFKµ which 
explicitly presents the proposition that Bobby had soup for lunch. Thus $OVWRQ·V 
modified analysis of assertion is as follows: 
 
U asserted that p in uttering S iff both:  
R: U 5·G that p 
EPe: S explicitly presents the proposition that p, or S is uttered as elliptical for a 
sentence that explicitly presents the proposition that p. 
 
However EPe causes more trouble for Alston than it prevents. Take the following 
utterance: «Clara: ´-RDQQD batted well todayµª ClaUD·V utterance here is correctly 
analyzed by $OVWRQ·V account as an assertion that Joanna batted well today. However, we 
might worry that &ODUD·V utterance is elliptical for the sentence ´-RDQQD batted well and 
played cricket WRGD\µ and even simply ´-RDQQD played cricket WRGD\µ Thus Clara is, 
according to Alston, asserting that Joanna batted well and played cricket today, and 
asserting that Joanna played cricket today, alongside innumerable other propositions 
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which are explicitly presented by sentences that the original utterance is elliptical for. 
Given that these propositions are, intuitively, not asserted by Clara, then the 
introduction of the EPe means that $OVWRQ·V second problem, of distinguishing 
assertions from their presuppositions, rears its ugly head once more. In attempting to 
account for assertions like ´6RXSµ Alston has fallen victim to the very problem he 
posed for other accounts of assertion4. 
It seems then, that adding ellipsis is too clumsy a move ³ it lets too much into the 
category of assertion. I propose however, that Alston was on the right track with this 
move ³ it is merely that we need to specify the right kind of ellipsis. Anaphoric 
dependence, I claim, specifies the right kind of ellipsis to individuate assertion. 
Anaphoric dependence is a linguistic phenomenon whereby the content of one token 
utterance is passed on to another token utterance. Take the example given by Brandom: 
«Have I read the book? I KDYHQ·W even taught it yet» (Brandom, 2005: 239). Here, ¶LW· 
anaphorically refers to ¶WKH ERRN· and thus the content of ¶LW· is determined by the 
content of its referent ³ ¶WKH ERRN· ¶,W· is of course a pronoun, but there are also 
¶SURVHQWHQFHV· expressions whose anaphoric reference can be an entire declarative 
sentence. Take, for example ¶\HV· which Brentano first described as a prosentence in 
1904: «Danny: ´'RHV Tim like the OLEUDU\"µ. Emma: ´<HV.µ» (Grover et al., 1975: 87-88). 
Here, EPPD·V utterance anaphorically refers to the sentence ´7LP likes the OLEUDU\µ 
(which can be derived from the context ³ 'DQQ\·V utterance) and derives its content 
thereof. Thus in this context the sentence ´<HVµ anaphorically refers to the sentence 
´7LP likes the OLEUDU\µ Note that that Tim likes the library is precisely the proposition 
that we take Emma to be asserting when she utters ´<HVµ We can thus use the notion 
of a prosentence anaphorically referring to another sentence in our definition of 
assertion: 
 
U asserted that p in uttering S iff both:  
R: U 5·G that p 
EPa: S explicitly presents the proposition that p, or S is a prosentence anaphorically 
referring to a sentence that explicitly presents p. 
 
To understand how this definition solves the problems faced by $OVWRQ·V account, let us 
return to the ¶VRXS· example. %REE\·V utterance of ´6RXSµ as a response to the $OLFH·V 
question ´:KDW did you have for lunch WRGD\µ is a prosentence that anaphorically refers 
to the sentence ´, had soup for OXQFKµ We derive this from the context ² $OLFH·V 
utterance. Remember the Brentano case: just as 'DQQ\·V utterance of ´'RHV Tim like 
the OLEUDU\"µ gives us the anaphoric referent ´7LP likes the OLEUDU\µ which Emma then 
refers to in her utterance of ´<HVµ $OLFH·V utterance of ´:KDW did you have for OXQFKµ 
tells us that the anaphoric referent of %REE\·V utterance is the sentence ´, had soup for 
OXQFKµ ´, had soup for OXQFKµ explicitly presents the proposition that I had soup for 
lunch. ´6RXSµ is thus correctly categorised as an assertion. The cricket counterexample 
is also dispatched, as &ODUD·V utterance of ´-RDQQa batted well WRGD\µ does not 
anaphorically refer to any sentence. There is no relevant context and thus no anaphoric 
reference. Thus the only proposition that is asserted by Clara is that which her utterance 
explicitly presents: that Joanna batted well today. 
                                                          
4 We might think that the ellipsis condition also means that Alston no longer has a satisfactory response 
to his first problem. Take the utterance ´:RZµ It is an expression of enthusiasm, but we might read it as 
elliptical for the sentence ´, am HQWKXVLDVWLFµ which explicitly presents the proposition that I am 
enthusiastic. ´:RZµ according to EPe, thus becomes an assertion. EPe would thus mean that Alston falls 
victim to his own first problem. 
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One might worry that a more challenging example comes when there is an anaphoric 
context providing a sentence to which the utterance refers in addition to a proposition 
explicitly presented by the sentence uttered: «Florence: ´'LG Joanna DJ WRGD\"µ. Gareth: 
´-RDQQD spun records well WRGD\µ». Here it seems that *DUHWK·V utterance anaphorically 
refers to the sentence ´-RDQQD did DJ today and spun records well WRGD\µ or ´<HV she 
did, and Joanna spun records well WRGD\µ or simply ´-RDQQD did DJ WRGD\µ and 
therefore Gareth counts as asserting that Joanna did DJ today. Yet given the context of 
*DUHWK·V utterance, it seems less than clear to me that this is not the correct result. 
Analogous to the soup example, intuitively Gareth is asserting that Joanna did DJ today 
in this context5. EPa thus provides the appropriate ellipsis relation for $OVWRQ·V account 
to correctly include assertions and rule out presuppositions. 
 
1.2  Alstonian Responsibility 
One might think that an account of assertion could be given just in terms of an explicit 
presentation condition. However, such an account would fail to individuate assertion 
from supposition and conjecture. In conjecturing ´7KH rain today will be especially 
KDUGµ the speaker explicitly presents the proposition that the rain today will be especially 
hard, and would, on this naïve account, wrongly count as asserting. Thus any such 
account would do well to be supplemented by a clause that accounts for the distinctive 
force of assertion ³ that in asserting that p one is somehow responsible for p·V being 
the case, in a way that one is not if one merely conjectures that p, or supposes that p for 
the sake of argument. We therefore need a responsibility condition R. For Alston: «RA: 
U 5·V that p in uttering S iff: In uttering S, U subjects their utterance to a rule that, in 
application to this case, implies that it is permissible for U to utter S only if p» (Alston, 
2000: 60). Where this rule is a social norm concerning what it is acceptable to say in a 
given language game, and lays the speaker open to criticism if they break that rule. 
Alston points out that this responsibility condition implies that if one asserts ´7KH cat is 
on the PDWµ one 5·V not only the propositional content of the assertion, but all of the 
presuppositions of the assertion, such as the presupposition that there is a cat (Alston, 
2002: 114-115). After all, it would be impermissible for one to utter ´7KH cat is on the 
PDWµ if there was not a cat. Thus alone this condition would not individuate assertion 
from presupposition ² it needs to be combined with an explicit presentation condition. 
The condition does, however, allow individuation of assertion from conjecture and 
supposition, acts which meet the explicit presentation condition, but not $OVWRQ·V 
requirement that one only perform them if one subjects RQH·V utterance to the rule that 
one may make that utterance only if the content of that utterance is the case. 
It might appear that $OVWRQ·V 5·LQJ condition is simply a constitutive norm of assertion, 
as endorsed by a tradition coming out of the work of Timothy Williamson6. However, 
we should not be quite so hasty to characterise Alston as a member of that tradition. 
For one, Williamsonian and other similar accounts only require that assertions be 
governed by some rule, whilst Alston requires that not only does assertion need to be 
governed by some rule, but that the rule governance must also be instituted by the 
speaker. Second, given that the 5·LQJ condition is combined with an explicit 
presentation condition in AOVWRQ·V final account, complaints that the definition of 
assertion is not rich enough (see Macfarlane 2011 on ¶%RRJOLQJ· will have a tougher 
time gaining traction. Nevertheless, Alston does take the norm that the 5·LQJ condition 
                                                          
5 Does my EPa version of $OVWRQ·V position fall victim to $OVWRQ·V first worry? Plausibly not. It seems hard 
to see how ´:RZµ or ´(ZZµ could anaphorically refer to sentences such as ´, am GLVJXVWHGµ 
6  See, for instance, Williamson (1996) and (2000), Jennifer Lackey (2007), Martin Montminy (2013),  
Matthew Weiner (2005), Keith DeRose (2002), and Igor Douven (2006). 
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describes, along with his explicit presentation condition, to be constitutive of assertion 
(Alston, 2000: 253). 
If the Alstonian 5·LQJ condition is (with these caveats in place) a norm of assertion, 
where do we place it in the taxonomy of those accounts? At first glance, it might be 
tempting to characterise it simply as a truth-norm of assertion (henceforth the T-rule). 
After all, if one may only assert that p only if p, and as is generally accepted, the T-
schema holds, then one may assert that p only if ¶S· is true. However, whilst Alston does 
take his rule to be the T-rule, he also thinks that his rule entails two other formulations 
of the 5·LQJ condition, whilst maintaining that RA (the T-rule) ´LV the most fundamental IRUPXODWLRQµ «RAP: U 5·V that p in uttering S ³ In uttering S, U purports to know that 
p.  RAR: U 5·V that p in uttering S ³ In uttering S, U represents p as being the case.» 
(Alston, 2000: 63). 
Alston argues that RA entails RAP, as one subjects oneself to that rule that one may assert 
that p only if p ² and thus one cannot purport to follow the rule without thereby 
purporting to know that one does so. Alston argues that RAR follows from RA, as when 
one subjects something to a rule that requires that p, one represents p as being the case 
(Alston, 2000: 63). 
Given that Alston regards RA as entailing RAP and RAR, if we can find counterexamples 
to these conditions, then by modus tollens, Alston ought to reject RA. As it happens, there 
are cases where we do not purport to know that p in uttering S, and yet still assert that p. 
Think of cases of openly insincere assertions, as used by Macfarlane to argue against 
Bach and +DUQLVK·V account of assertion (see Macfarlane, 2011: 82), in such examples, it 
is common knowledge between myself and my interlocutor that I do not believe p, and 
yet I still assert that p. Think of a hopelessly lost position in a football game. Both 
myself and my team know that I know we will lose ³ we are 4-0 down with five 
minutes to play. Here, I might assert ´:H·UH still in this ³ we have a chance to win 
KHUHµ7. Further, even if Alston were to change his mind and reject the inference from 
RA to RAP, RA itself is vulnerable to the objections Williamson has made against the 
truth norm of assertion8. It seems, then, that if we are to have an account of assertion of 
this sort, we had better have a different responsibility condition. 
 
 
2. %UDQGRP·V$FFRXQW 
For such a responsibility condition, we might turn to Robert %UDQGRP·V account of 
assertion, which is given solely in terms of a responsibility condition. I will suggest that, 
alone, %UDQGRP·V account fails, as it cannot individuate assertion from presupposition. 
However, I will suggest that precisely because this is a problem that is nicely solved by 
$OVWRQ·V explicit presentation condition, using %UDQGRP·V account to provide the 
responsibility condition R for $OVWRQ·V account gives us a very attractive position on the 
nature of assertion. %UDQGRP·V account of assertion attempts to frame assertion in terms 
of the social statuses we undertake or acknowledge when making an assertion. Such 
social statuses are normative, and constituted by members of a conversation treating the 
speaker as so committed. Borrowing the notion of a conversational score from David 
Lewis (1979), Brandom thinks that members of a conversation keep score of the 
deontic statuses undertaken by themselves and other members of the conversation, 
                                                          
7 For further discussion of such examples, see Michaelson, 2018. 
8 See Williamson 2000. Certainly, the T-norm has a much harder time making sense of things like ´+RZ 
do you know WKDWµ responses to assertions and Moorean ¶SDUDGR[HV· See also the objections to factive 
accounts of assertion given by Dodd 1999, Lackey 2007, McKinnon 2013, Marsili 2018 and Kneer 2018. 
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attributing to themselves and others the appropriate commitments and entitlements9. 
For Brandom, asserting some claim is to undertake or acknowledge two such statuses. It 
is to endorse the claim, enabling others to use it as a premise in inference, and to 
commit10. oneself to the claim, undertaking a conditional task-responsibility to justify it 
if challenged (Brandom, 1994: 170-173, 1983: 640-641). 
Endorsement is a deontic status that one can undertake. In so doing (perhaps via an 
utterance) one states that one has the authority to make some claim, and that others 
may, on the basis of that authority, use that claim as a premise in further inference. In 
the context of an assertion, if the assertion goes unchallenged, or is justified 
appropriately in response to challenges, an assertion has the effect of the speaker 
endorsing that which the assertion claims 11 . In this technical Brandomian sense of 
endorsement, the assertion (via the deontic status undertaken by the speaker) authorises 
further assertions, including the re-assertion of the original claim and those claims 
which are entailed (logically or materially) by the original claim. The audience of the 
assertion are thus offered what we might call an ¶LQIHUHQFH WLFNHW· licensing further 
assertions. The ticket metaphor is a useful one. Suppose I offer you a ticket to attend a 
performance of Twelfth Night by the Royal Shakespeare Company. In doing so I am 
offering you a socially significant license to perform further social acts, specifically those 
to do with sitting and watching a play. In the same way, my asserting to you 
´6KDNHVSHDUH was a better playwright than 0DUORZHµ offers you a license to perform 
social acts, including asserting that ´6KDNHVSHDUH was a better playwright than 
0DUORZHµ12. In this way, assertions have a role in what Brandom calls ¶WKH game of 
giving and asking for UHDVRQV· ³ asserting something gives a reason for further 
assertions, and can serve as a response when one is asked for a reason. 
However, assertion involves not only endorsement, but commitment: 
 
In asserting a claim one not only authorizes further assertions, but commits 
oneself to vindicate the original claim, showing that one is entitled to make it. 
Failure to defend RQH·V entitlement to an assertion voids its social significance as 
inferential warrant for further assertions. It is only assertions one is entitled to 
make can that serve to entitle others to its inferential consequences. Endorsement 
is empty unless the commitment can be defended (Brandom, 1983: 641). 
 
In asserting, «one undertakes the conditional task responsibility to justify the claim if 
challenged» (Brandom, 1983: 641-642). Where a ¶WDVN-UHVSRQVLELOLW\· is defined as a 
                                                          
9 As an anonymous reviewer has helpfully noted, there is a difference between %UDQGRP·V and /HZLV·V 
notions of the conversational score. Whilst Lewis and his followers generally take the scorekeeper to be 
an objective asserter, Brandom takes the scorekeepers to be the participants of the conversation 
themselves. Importantly, this allows for A and %·V scorecards to differ, and, so Brandom suggests, A and 
%·V recognition of this fact grounds intentionality and representation. 
10 Brandom unhelpfully uses commitment in two senses. The first sense is a broad commonsense notion 
of any normative status that demands some action, the latter sense a technical term referring to a specific 
normative commitment detailed below. Hereafter I shall refer to the former as commitment, the latter as 
commitmentb. 
11 This is because, according to Brandom, entitlement has a «default and challenge structure» (Brandom, 
1994: 243). 
12 The metaphor goes further. Suppose the ticket I gave you to attend the theatre with was a bad one (I 
used a photocopier to produce a forgery). Upon seeing the ticket, you can challenge me about the 
goodness of the ticket, or if you decide to attempt to use it anyway, the guard at the door of the theatre 
will challenge you about the legitimacy of the ticket. So too for licenses to assert (see Brandom, 1994: 
161). 
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responsibility which requires the fulfillment of a task (in this case, the task of justifying 
the claim) in order to be fulfilled. Thus, one commitsb oneself to some claim if one is 
willing to justify it in some way if challenged. There are three ways in which this 
justificatory task can be fulfilled. First, there is the appeal to the authority of another, 
who has also asserted the claim, and upon whose authority one bases RQH·V own 
assertion. Second, one can make further assertions, justifying the content of the first 
assertion. Third, one can invoke RQH·V own authority as a reliable reporter of non-
inferential information (as one does in cases of reporting how one feels, or in cases 
where one is the only person who has observed some phenomena) (Brandom, 1994: 
174). Note that in each of these ways of fulfilling the justificatory task, one is passing 
the justificatory buck, whether to another speaker, other assertions, or RQH·V own 
reliability as an observer. These authorities for RQH·V assertion can themselves be 
challenged and defended in the same ways as the original assertion. Of course, this leads 
to a potentially endless chain of further justifications, but this need not be problematic, 
given that the justifications are only required when the asserter is challenged to provide them ² 
the task responsibility is, after all, a conditional task responsibility. This commitmentb 
aspect of assertion captures a second distinctive aspect of assertion, its force ² that 
when we assert something, we are somehow responsible for what we have asserted. 
Challenging obviously plays a central role in this definition of assertion, but Brandom is 
a little unclear on what exactly it consists in. Thankfully Jeremy Wanderer has provided 
a set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions that are implicit in %UDQGRP·V Making 
it Explicit: 
 
The first (C1) is that the successful act of challenging must provide the condition 
requiring the challenged asserter to undertake the task of demonstrating 
entitlement to the challenged claim. The second (C2) is that the effect of a 
successful challenge, according to a scorekeeper, is to remove the default 
entitlement associated with a claim, suspending entitlement to the claim pending 
successful defence. The third (C3) is that the challenge must be an act that can be 
performed appropriately or inappropriately; it must be susceptible to being 
challenged itself, so that successfully challenging the challenge is one way of 
restoring the entitlement to a claim (Wanderer, 2010: 100). 
 
Whilst Wanderer and Brandom (see Brandom, 2010) take this definition to imply that all 
challenges are assertions of incompatible propositions, I fail to see how this follows. 
Indeed, what I take to be nice about the above definition, put in terms of the effects of 
a speech act, is that it allows for challenges to take a plurality of forms. The challenge 
need not be a question, but could be an assertion, or even a promise or order. 
Suppose Johann utters ´7KH moon is made of FKHHVHµ All the following responses to 
that utterance, count as challenges on :DQGHUHU·V account, and I take it that it is 
intuitive that we would ordinarily count them as such: 
 
Jamelia: ´$UH you VXUH"µ 
Josephine: ´7KH moon LVQ·W made of FKHHVHµ 
James: ´, promise you, \RX·UH ZURQJµ 
Jackie: ´<RX are going to have to show me where it says that on the NASA 
website before I accept WKDWµ 
Jennifer: ´3URYH LWµ 
 
Accounting for the variety of utterances that can count as challenges, and having given 
fairly rigorous conditions for which acts count as assertions, I think that Brandom and 
his followers should be happy to rely on :DQGHUHU·V definition. 
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3. ,QGLYLGXDWLQJ$VVHUWLRQ$3UREOHPIRU%UDQGRP·V$FFRXQW 
Despite capturing two important aspects of assertion, %UDQGRP·V account is not without 
its difficulties. I suggest that, just like the ¶FRPPLWPHQW-RQO\· account of assertion put 
forward by Alston prior to adding his explicit presentation condition, %UDQGRP·V fails to 
distinguish assertion from presupposition13. %UDQGRP·V account gives a simple answer to 
the question of how to individuate assertion from conjecture or supposition. In the case 
of conjecture or supposition, the responsibility condition is not met, whilst in the case 
of assertion, it is. When one makes a supposition, whilst one does enable others to use 
the content as a premise in inference (albeit conditionally) one is only suggesting the 
content of the speech act. Thus one does not undertake an obligation to justify it if 
challenged ² thus one is not committedb to the content. I take it that the same is true of 
conjecture. 
However, %UDQGRP·V account struggles to distinguish that which is asserted from that 
which is presupposed. Ceteris paribus if I say ´7KH cat is on the PDWµ I presuppose that 
there is a cat, yet in doing so I both endorse and commitb myself to the claim that there 
is a cat and so according to Brandom I assert that there is a cat. I endorse the claim, as 
after I have said ´7KH cat is on the PDWµ others are entitled to use the claim that there is 
a cat as a premise in inference. Meanwhile, I am committedb to the claim that there is a 
cat, as in uttering ´7KH cat is on the PDWµ I undertake an obligation to justify the claim 
that there is a cat14. Thus %UDQGRP·V account treats many presuppositions as assertions 
and is thus insufficient for a definition of assertion, as it fails to properly individuate 
assertion from presuppositions. 
Brandom might respond contra the above that assertions are unique (and therefore 
individuated) as according to him, only they both perform the role of being that which 
reasons are asked for, and that which giving a reason consists in. Thus whilst one can 
ask what the reason for (the justification of) an action was, one cannot offer an action as 
a reason for anything15. Meanwhile, whilst one can offer the reliability of an observer as 
a reason for believing that observer, one cannot ask for the reason for (in the sense of a 
justification of) the reliability of the observer. My assertion of some claim, however, can 
both provide a reason and stand in need of reasons to justify it (Brandom, 1994: 167). 
However, presuppositions also stand in this dual relation to a reason. If I assert ´0\ job 
DSSOLFDWLRQ·V rejection letter came through WRGD\µ which presupposes that I sent off a 
job application, not only would an interlocutor be quite within their rights to demand 
justification for (reasons for) accepting the claim that I sent off a job application, but 
they would also be acting legitimately were they to take the claim that I sent off a job 
application itself as a reason16. Assertion, then, cannot be individuated by reference to 
                                                          
13 See Alston 2000 and Marsili 2015 for further discussion. 
14 After all, it would be fine for someone to use my utterance as justification for not letting someone with 
a cat allergy come near us, and it would be fine for someone to challenge me on my utterance by saying, 
´:KDW" What do you mean WKHUH·V a FDW"µ or ´7KHUH·V no FDWµ 
15 It is unclear whether this is in fact the case. Ordinary language suggests that actions can play the role of 
reasons in this sense ² we can quite easily imagine a bartender who, when asked why they threw a punter 
from their bar would reply ´7KH\ punched another FXVWRPHUµ or show a CCTV video of the punch, or 
mimic the act of punching. Whether this is surface ¶JUDPPDU· misleading us as to the underlying 
metaphysical nature of reasons notwithstanding, contemporary debates in the metaphysics of reasons are 
inconclusive, and we should not be quick in accepting BrandoP·V claim here. 
16 Suppose, for example, that I utter ´7KH library will close in an KRXUµ Here I assert that the library will 
close in an hour, and presuppose that the library is currently open. My interlocutor could quite reasonably 
take this presupposition as a reason for action, for instance, immediately leaving to return some books to 
the library. 
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the unique relation that assertions have to the notion of a reason, as presuppositions 
also incur these sorts of commitments17. 
This said, %UDQGRP·V account captures something important about assertion, that is, the 
normative force that assertions carry. In the next section, I will outline $OVWRQ·V 
position, before showing how combining it with the Brandomian picture both answers 
the individuation question and retains this nice account of assertoric force. 
 
 
4. The Alstonian-Brandomian Account 
I therefore suggest that we incorporate %UDQGRP·V responsibility condition into $OVWRQ·V 
account, along with the changes I proposed to the explicit presentation condition, in 
order to adequately deal with cases of ellipsis. In outlining the account, I will (perhaps 
somewhat unfaithfully to Brandom) give his R conditions a representationalist framing, 
but given that Alstonian account are committed to a form of representationalism, I take 
it that this is no major issue. 
 
U asserted that p in uttering S iff both: 
EPa: S explicitly presents the proposition that p, or S is a prosentence anaphorically 
referring to a sentence that explicitly presents p. 
R: U 5·G that p 
Where U 5·V that p in uttering S iff both: 
RB1: U endorses that p, offering license to make inferences from p, 
RB2: U commitsb to p, undertaking a justificatory responsibility for p. 
 
I take this to be the correct account of assertion. In what follows I shall show that it 
adequately individuates assertion, and explains a number of linguistic data that are often 
canvassed in favour of rival accounts. Finally I shall show that it adequately responds to 
a couple of putative objections. 
 
4.1 Individuating Assertion 
My Alstonian account of assertion individuates assertion from conjecture and 
supposition on the one hand, and presupposition on the other, by incorporating the 
best aspects of Brandom and $OVWRQ·V accounts. The following indicates how the 
conditions individuate assertion: 
 
 EPa RB1 RB2 
Assertion 9 9 9 
Presupposition X Sometimes Sometimes 
Conjecture/Supposition 9 9 X 
Expression of Emotion X ? ? 
Speech Act Commitments X Sometimes Sometimes 
 
In asserting that p, all three conditions are met. Meanwhile, when one presupposes that 
p, one does not explicitly present the proposition that p. Take my utterance ´&DO is stuck 
                                                          
17 An anonymous reviewer has suggested that Brandom and his followers might be able to produce 
machinery that allows them to distinguish between assertion and presupposition. If so, then this objection 
can be read as an invitation to provide such machinery. As the reviewer who pushed me on this has 
pointed out, it minimally looks like this would take a great deal of work, and I myself am unclear on how 
it might be achieved. In any case, a full development of such a dialogue between the Brandomite and their 
sceptical opposition goes beyond the scope of this paper, which is largely interested in harvesting the 
Brandomian account for parts to improve the Alstonian account. 
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in the ZHOOµ Here, I presuppose (amongst other things) that there is a well which one 
can get stuck down ² yet my utterance does not explicitly present that proposition, nor 
does my sentence anaphorically refer to a sentence that explicitly presents the 
proposition that there is a well to get stuck down. Thus EPa is not met. Further, in some 
cases, one does not R the presuppositions of RQH·V utterances18. In conjecturing that p, 
or supposing that p, as in ´)RU the purposes of argument, metaphysical zombies H[LVWµ 
one explicitly presents the proposition that metaphysical zombies exist, and thus RQH·V 
conjecture meets EPa. One also endorses that p ² indeed, one of the main functions of 
supposition is as the putting forward of some claim as a premise for further inference. 
However, one is not committedb to the utterance, and is under no obligation to justify 
that claim, thus conjecture does not meet RB2
19
. 
As to the expression of emotion, which gave rise to $OVWRQ·V first question, it is quite 
clear that Tess does not explicitly present the proposition that she is elated at her victory 
when she shouts ´<HVµ It also seems difficult to see how such an utterance could 
anaphorically refer to the sentence ´, am elated at my YLFWRU\µ Finally, to $OVWRQ·V third 
question, the addition of the EPa condition rules out the commitments of other speech 
acts counting as assertions20. The 0DMRU·V order, ´3ROLVK your boots 3ULYDWHµ does not 
explicitly present the proposition that the private will be placed under an obligation by 
the utterance of the order, nor does the order anaphorically refer to a sentence which 
explicitly presents that proposition. 
 
4.2 3DJLQ·V2EMHFWLRQ 
In Is Assertion Social? Peter Pagin provides an objection to theories that rely on what he 
calls social significance to define assertion. One type of social significance condition that 
Pagin considers is what I have been calling responsibility conditions for assertion, and 
he regards theories based on such conditions as extensionally inadequate, including 
utterances that we would not ordinarily count as assertions in the category of assertions. 
Pagin considers what I take to be a Moorean (see Moore, 1962) responsibility condition: 
«To assert that p is to commit oneself to the truth of p» (Pagin, 2004: 838). He points 
out that if assertion is defined according to this definition, then the utterance of any of 
the following would count as an assertion that p: «P1: ´, hereby commit myself to the 
truth of pµ P2: ´, guarantee that pµ. P3: ´, promise that pµ» (ivi: 838-839)21. 
According to Pagin, none of these seem to be assertions of p, but all would be counted 
as assertions of p by a definition of assertion that relied solely on a Moorean 
responsibility condition. More pertinently to my project, Pagin presents a similar 
counterexample to %UDQGRP·V definition of assertion. He neatly puts %UDQGRP·V 
definition as: «To assert that p is to authorize the audience to claim whatever follows 
from p and to undertake the responsibility of justifying p» (ivi: 839). Which, he claims, 
wrongly categorises the following as an assertion of p: «P4: ´, hereby authorize you to 
                                                          
18 For example, I take it that a child does not endorse or commitb to the axioms of mathematics when 
they utter ´ µ 
19 An anonymous reviewer has suggested there are other options open to the Alstonian here. They might, 
for instance, suggest that RB1 requires completely unconditional, unqualified endorsement of p. 
As such, in cases of conjecture or supposition, where some p is put forward in a qualified or conditional 
sense, RB1, in addition to RB2 is not met. Full discussion of the interesting question of conjecture and 
supposition goes beyond the scope of this paper, but see however Labinaz 2018. 
20 Subject to my earlier reservations regarding the propositional content of the speech act itself intuitively 
counting as an assertion. 
21 I am unsure as to whether or not we would ordinarily characterise P2 and P3 as assertions of p (see 
footnote 2). Nonetheless, P1 is enough to underline 3DJLQ·V point here. 
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claim whatever follows from p and undertake the responsibility of justifying pµª (ivi: 
840). 
Pagin thus produces a mechanism for producing counterexamples to theories defined in 
terms of an 5·LQJ condition ³ any utterance of the form ´, hereby [µ where x is the 
definition of assertion, will be counted as an assertion of some p by the theory, but will 
be unlikely to be intuitively thought to be an assertion of that p. 
Yet whilst this is a counterexample to %UDQGRP·V theory22, as Philip Pegan points out, 
3DJLQ·V counterexamples will only do as a response to theories of assertion that are 
expressed wholly in such terms (the 5·LQJ condition being necessary and sufficient for 
assertion) and not those theories that claim that social effects are merely necessary for 
assertion (Pegan, 2009: 2557-2558). Thus my Alstonian theory of assertion is 
untroubled, as it would not count P4 as an assertion, because P4 does not meet EPa. 
Pegan does, however, offer a potential counterexample generator to theories that rely 
on something like an explicit presentation condition: 
 
P5: ´,Q making the following utterance I intend to undertake a commitment to the 
truth of the proposition expressed by the sentence I utter: The Red Sox ZRQµ 
P6: ´,Q uttering the sentence I next utter, I intend to undertake a commitment to 
the truth of the proposition it expresses: The Red Sox ZRQµ (ivi: 2561). 
 
Applying this counterexample generator to my Alstonian theory, we get a putative 
counterexample: «P7: ´,Q making the following utterance, I hereby authorize you to 
claim whatever follows from it and undertake the responsibility of justifying it: The Red 
Sox ZRQµª 
Yet it is less than clear to me that P7 (and for that matter P5 and P6) are not what we 
would ordinarily characterise as assertions. It is simply that in each case the implications 
of the last clause (the assertion proper) are made explicit in the earlier clauses. Indeed, I 
take it that P7 is mostly an exercise in redundancy, wherein one asserts that the Red Sox 
won after having made explicit what it means to assert that the Red Sox won. Both 
Pegan (2009: 2561) and Pagin (2009: 2565-2566) believe that there are non-assertoric 
readings of the ¶WKH Red Sox ZRQ· clause. Pegan does not take the non-assertoric 
reading of ¶WKH Red Sox ZRQ· to be a counterexample to Alstonian theories, whilst Pagin 
does. I, for one, simply cannot see what a non-assertoric reading of such an utterance 
amounts to when embedded in such a sentence ² and given that such examples are designed 
with the aim of contradicting our intuitions with regards to what counts as an assertion, 
I do not feel the force of 3DJLQ·V objection here. 
It might be further objected that the real issue is that the utterance P7 can be correct, or 
accurate, even if the Red Sox do not win (thank you to the editors for pushing me on 
this point). Thus, we might think, the account of assertion offered here is odd, in that it 
allows an assertion of p to be correct or accurate, even if p fails to be the case. Certainly, 
it might look like a desideratum of a theory of assertion that it should not allow a case in 
which p is asserted correctly or accurately when p is not the case. However, in defence 
of the Alstonian account, we can say a few things. The first is that accepting this 
desideratum flies in the face of the ordinary intuition that uttering ¶, hereby assert that p· 
counts as an assertion of p (see Macfarlane, 2011: 93). Second, even if we accept this 
desideratum, we must note that the Alstonian account only allows such problematic 
cases when those cases have a very specific form, that is, the form given by P7 ² and as 
such, these problematic cases turn out to be extremely fringe cases. Third, even in those 
fringe cases, it is not as if nothing is ¶JRLQJ ZURQJ· so to speak, even if the assertion is 
                                                          
22 I will not discuss potential Brandomian responses for want of space. 
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accurate or correct. In cases with the specific form of P7 where ¶WKH red sox ZRQ· or 
another equivalent p is not the case, we can say that the utterer has 5·G something that is 
not the case, and is therefore criticisable23. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
I take it that if the reader finds the above convincing, they ought to at least take the 
account of assertion I have offered seriously. Whilst it goes beyond the scope of this 
paper to argue for the inadequacy of rival accounts, should the reader already have their 
misgivings regarding such alternatives, the Alstonian-Brandomian account becomes a 
rather attractive account of assertion. 
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